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a b s t r a c t
African elephants are iconic species threatened by poaching and China was considered as
one of the main destinations for illegally sourced ivory. In this article we combine two
surveys of ivory carving enterprises with other data sets, including Chinese government
seizure statistics, market prices for illegal ivory and substitute goods, to understand the
impact of enforcement and demand reduction measures on ivory prices and poaching. Our
analysis indicates the strong enforcement measures to combat ivory smuggling tempo-
rarily suppressed the tendency of illegal trade while stimulating a steep rise in illegal ivory
prices thereafter. Peaking in 2012e2013, prices thereafter fell due to government measures
to reduce demand under China's ‘Ecological Civilization’ programme and the announce-
ment of ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’. Our survey suggests that most Chinese
carving enterprises were intending to close or to diversify their business activities away
from ivory carving as a result of the total ban on domestic ivory trading by 31st December
2017. And China had banned domestic ivory trade for over half a year and all ivory carving
enterprises closed their ivory business activities since this domestic ban. In order to pre-
vent ivory demand in other countries that may undermine Chinese efforts, we argue that
other countries now also need to adopt multifaceted actions to curtail their domestic ivory
trade.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
African elephants are iconic species threatened by ivory poaching and populations are declining in various parts of Africa
(Wittemyer et al., 2011; 2014). It is now recognized at the highest policy levels (e.g., UN General Assembly Resolution 69/314,
2015; CITES Res. Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP17); London Declaration on Illegal Wildlife Trade 2014), that a range of conservation
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actions at national and international levels are necessary to combat this illegal trade, including the engagement of local
communities at source sites, effective law enforcement along international trade chains and efforts to understand and address
demand in key consumer markets (Cooney et al., 2016; Challender and MacMillan, 2014).
In order to effectively implement these actions, there is an urgent need to improve understanding of the dynamics of the
illegal ivory trade, especially from the Chinese perspective, because China was considered as one of the key destinations for
raw ivory in the past years (Gao and Clark, 2014). However, the lack of reliable long-term data on actual illegal trade volumes
(CITES, 2017a) and prices, and the clandestine nature of this trade, severely curtails analysis in this complex policy arena
(Moyle, 2014; CITES, 2017b; Underwood et al., 2013).
China, recognized as one of themain destinations for illegally sourced ivory (Gao and Clark, 2014), has recently undertaken
signiﬁcant measures to curtail supply and reduce demand and ended its domestic ivory trade at the end of 2017. In this article,
we combine market information gathered from 2 surveys of Chinese ivory carving factories, with time series data on illegal
ivory prices, elephant poaching, Chinese government seizure data, the price of substitute goods of ivory, and China's economic
data to investigate and demonstrate how multifaceted policy efforts under China‘s ‘Ecological Civilization’ programme and
'The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre' impacted ivory trade dynamics. China's 'Ecological Civilization' programme seeks to
alter production and consumption modes and lifestyles to protect and enhance the environment.
2. The policy context and our approach
Understanding the linkages between elephant conservation and trafﬁcking in ivory is handicapped by inadequate long-
term data on prices, substitute commodities and enforcement action (Burn et al., 2011). Although we recognize a number
of drivers are connected to poaching levels such as price, poor governance (Bennett, 2015) and the impact of policy in-
terventions (Hsiang and Sekar, 2016), the full complexity is difﬁcult to examine in quantitative terms as large, long-term
datasets are required to explore the complex systems and dynamic interacting processes that operate in illegal trade.
These are currently lacking. Previous studies that have relied purely on statistical inferences from existing data have been
severely criticized (Hsiang and Sekar, 2016) for failing to incorporate all known major drivers of poaching including demand,
enforcement effort (Underwood and Burn, 2016), and which is partially confounded by unobservable changes in markets and
law enforcement effort (Gao and Clark, 2014).
Hence, in this study we attempt to present a more holistic analysis of data trends salient to dynamics of poaching and its
links to elephant poaching by combing new and original datawith ofﬁcial government data on illegally traded ivory seized by
Chinese Customs from 2001 to 2017, and corresponding time series data on the price of illegal ivory in China and its close
substitute, jade, and China's economic data. To enrich our understanding of price movements and market drivers we also
interviewedmanagers of legal ivory carving factories in China, which combined, represent over 50% of the nation's total gross
production of carved ivory. As no ofﬁcial or reliable records are kept for price data we researched secondary data for illegal
ivory prices for the period 2006 to 2017 from various websites and established average price trends over this time period.
The datasets we drew on comprise the following:
1) The proportion of illegally killed elephants
The proportion of illegally killed elephants (PIKE) data is derived by a cause of death examination at the site and can be
scaled up to the sub-regional and continental levels to estimate numbers of elephants killed and absolute poaching rates
(CITES, 2017a; 2017b). The proportion of illegally killed elephants is depicted in Fig. 1a and has been increasing since 2005
(Fig. 1a).
2) Seizure data
Fig. 1b describes ivory seizure data from Chinese Customs. The data includes original seizure data of illegal ivory and
carvings recorded by Chinese Customs from 2001 to 2017. The ofﬁcers responsible for seizures entered the data when the
seizures occurred.
3) Price data
A major limitation to understanding illegal wildlife trade is the failure of CITES to require Parties to the Convention (i.e.
nation states) to collect market price data, despite its importance to understanding illegal trade dynamics (Challender et al.,
2015; MacMillan and Han, 2011). Hence, we established the trend in average illegal ivory prices from 2006 to 2017 from
various online sources. Price data on raw ivory or ivory carvings traded illegally is difﬁcult to obtain so we collected the price
data of illegal ivory in general.
Prices of Hetian jade, a close substitute for carved ivory were obtained from market information provided by Xinjiang
Province, which is the centre for Hetian jade carving in China. Fig. 1c shows that the price of illegal ivory was increasing until
2013, but fell dramatically thereafter. A similar trend can be observedwith Hetian jade of all qualities and sizes (Fig. 1d and e).
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4) China's economic data
China's economic data, including China's GDP, PCDI (Per Capita Disposable Income), growth rate of GDP, growth rate of
PCDI and Gini coefﬁcient from 2008 to 2017, were obtained from the website of National Bureau of Statistics of China (Fig. 2).
Fig. 1. a Proportion of illegally killed elephants from 2003 to 2016 based on MIKE data. https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/data_and_reports. b Trend of ivory
(including ivory carvings) seizures 2001 to 2017 from China's General Administration of Customs. c Trend of prices of illegal ivory from 2006 to 2017. d,e Trend of
Hetian jade prices from 2011 to 2017 (3A、2A、1A represents different levels of jade, 3A is the highest level see http://www.cnhetianyu.com/upload/
xinxilianmeng/zhidaojia.html).
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Fig. 2. GDP from 2008 to 2017 based on NBSPRC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) http://data.stats.gov.cn/ks.htm?cn¼C01&zb¼A0501. b PCDI from 2011 to
2017 based on NBSPRC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn¼C01&zb¼A0A01&sj¼2016. c Growth rate of GDP from
2008 to 2017 based on NBSPRC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) http://data.stats.gov.cn/ks.htm?cn¼C01&zb¼A0501. d Growth rate of PCDI from 2011 to
2017 based on NBSPRC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn¼C01&zb¼A0A01&sj¼2016. e Gini Coefﬁcient from 2008
to 2017 based on NBSPRC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) http://www.stats.gov.cn/.
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5) Two surveys of Chinese ivory carving enterprises.
Interviews of the ﬁrst survey were carried out by E-mail during March 2016 based on a semi-structured questionnaire. In
total 26 out of all 34 ofﬁcially recognized legal ivory carving enterprises took part, representing over 50% of total output of
carved ivory in China. Interviews of the second survey were carried out by telephone during September 2017 based on a
structured questionnaire, 25 of all 34 ofﬁcially recognized legal ivory carving factories took part.
3. Ivory trafﬁcking, market dynamics and China's response
To further enforcement ivory management, since 2008, the Chinese government, in collaboration with international or-
ganizations, began a series of initiatives to eliminate wildlife products entering China illegally (for example, China partici-
pated in the ‘Trans-regional Joint Operation’ against great apes and other endangered species organized by WCO (World
Customs Organizations) in JaneFeb. 2011) and Chinese Customs Agencies took steps to intercept illegal trafﬁcked ivory.
Consequently, ivory seizures dramatically rose in 2011 and 2012 (Fig. 1b). These enforcement measures had an immediate
effect on suppressing the tendency of illegal trade (CITES, 2013; Xia, 2015), but the prices of illegal ivory rose quickly (Fig. 1c)
probably due to restricted supply and as a result of investor speculation in raw ivory (Harvey et al., 2017). The increasing price
may be one of the main reasons for the increasing poaching rate of elephants (Fig. 1a).
Around 2013/14 the situation changes dramatically, with the illegal price of ivory falling. Evidence from our survey of ivory
carving establishments clearly points to two crucial factors at play here. There are launch of China's drive towards ‘Ecological
Civilization’ (EC) and the announcement of ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’. The EC initiative was proposed in the
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012. The 18th National Congress of CPC report
raised public awareness of the need to conserve resources, protect the environment and promote ecological progress, and
foster a social atmosphere of practicing moderate consumption and cherishing the ecological environment (Hu, 2012). It
signaled an integration of ecological considerations into all aspects of Chinese policies for economy and society and recog-
nized the importance of adjusting human production and consumption modes and lifestyles to protect and enhance the
environment (Yu, 2013; Li et al., 2014). Soon after ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’ was announced in December 2012
to reduce bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work habits (Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 2012; PTI,
2015). Also the CCDI (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) established a monthly reporting system since August
2013 to monitor the implementation of ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’ nationwide (PTI, 2015). Associated mea-
sures relevant to ivory include restrictions on advertising luxury products from February 2013 by China's State Administration
of Radio, Film and Television (The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People's
Republic of China, 2013) and a crackdown on the gray market for ivory, together with other initiatives had a signiﬁcant
impact on consumer spending on luxuries and expensive gifts. These unprecedented policies and their powerful imple-
mentation also reduced demand from speculation. During this period there was also a marked slowdown of the annual
average growth of luxury spending in China falling from þ30% in 2011, to 1% in 2014 (Gao, 2013; Tang, 2015) with overall
spending by Chinese consumers of high net worth on gifts down by 25% (Hurun Report, 2014). For example, the consumption
share of pre-paid shopping card expenditures in top quality department stores decreased from 30% in 2012 to 15% 2013, and
to just 10% by 2014 (Tang, 2015). As can be seen in Fig. 1d and e, the prices of another important luxury good, Hetian jade, also
fell in a similar way to ivory.
The decreasing of ivory and jade prices can't be simply attributed to the slow growth of China's economy because China's
GDP and PCDI (Fig. 2) have been increasing while the proportion of illegally killed elephants has ﬂuctuated (Fig. 1) since 2008.
Furthermore, the temporary slow growth of GDP and PCDI 2013 to 2016 might be related to the construction of ‘Ecological
Civilization’ and the implementation of ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’, which constrained the power of ofﬁcials
(Wang, 2014) and the consumption of ‘the three public expenses’ (buy and use cars, travel overseas and host meetings) and
reduced the consumption of high-end restaurants and luxury goods (Li and Cheng, 2013; Yang and Chang, 2014) and regu-
lated the order of income distribution (Wang, 2014). Since 2013, Gini coefﬁcient had a signiﬁcant decrease (Fig. 2), indicating
the decreasing inequality in China, which is the direct results of EC and ‘The Eight-point Regulation of the Centre’ (Wang,
2014).
Information provided by the managers of Chinese ivory carving factories also support the ‘demand reduction’ narrative
with the majority indicating that the peak year for expensive ivory carving sales was 2013 (Fig. 3). Since then there has been a
signiﬁcant slump in demand for carvings, especially for larger carved ivory pieces typically used as luxury gifts, with con-
sumer demand now concentrated on smaller, less valuable ivory carvings. Some managers mentioned that EC related
campaigns have led many young people in China to believe that consuming ivory carvings is ‘shamed’ and have adopted
negative attitudes toward ivory carving purchase. Taken together, this evidence suggests that recent falls in ivory prices have
clearly been driven by demand management measures in China.
We also questioned ivory carving enterprises (in China, most of ivory carvings enterprises not only operate ivory but also
other products business) about the impact of the domestic ban on ivory carving and found that around half would downsize
their business to survive while around one quarter reported they could cease trading (Fig. 4a). The remainer would diversify
their other business activities after ivory trade ban. And now all ivory carvings factories in China had banned their ivory
business. However, none of the enterprises believed that the domestic ban would end poaching, with most of the view that
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Fig. 3. a: Has there been a big change of ivory carvings sales in recent years? 3b: In terms of sales in the last 7 years what has been the peak year? 3c: What were
the drivers of slower sales since the peak year?
Fig. 4. a: What will be the impact of the ivory ban on future activities of the enterprise? 4b: What do you think will be the impact of the ivory ban on future
elephant poaching activities?
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poaching would continue as before as elephants are killed for many reasons (Fig. 4b) such as property right and poor
governance.
4. Towards global governance on illegal ivory trade
Although we have shown how China has made signiﬁcant interventions to curtail elephant poaching, the proportion of
illegally killed elephants remained above the long-term average, thus it may be too early to contemplate an end to poaching.
This is because the diverse drivers (including property rights, criminal proﬁteers, speculative investors, and demand from end
consumers) at play combined with factors that facilitate the proliferation of poaching and trafﬁcking in other countries
(including poor governance, inadequate enforcement). In our view, unless there are stronger andmore coherent global efforts
to implement effective law enforcement by closing all ivorymarkets against the speculative demand from other countries and
other poaching drivers, we can expect the threat to the African elephant to remain.
In recent years there have been other notable steps by individual state and collectively in international agreement taken to
regulate the ivory trade, for example by the U.S and similar measures within CITES that have been mandated of Parties in
various Resolutions (Res. Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP17); Res. Conf. 17.4) as part of the National Ivory Action Plan (NIAP) process.
While the closure of domestic ivory markets in China represents a step toward achieving an effective global trade ban, such
action should be supported and encouraged by the global community (Wittemyer, 2016) and other countries also need to act
to curtail their domestic markets in ivory products (Knights, 2018). A global consensus is growing for a complete ban on trade
in ivory to combat elephant poaching (Sekar et al., 2018). Similar coordinated actions have worked before; For example, the
EU ban on the importation of wild birds into Europe in 2007 following the outbreak of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza. However the
dynamics and politics of illegal trafﬁcking of ivory from Africa, including the persistence of incentives for individuals to poach
in Africa (Nkoke et al., 2017), suggests that we are now entering unchartered territory for global governance of this high
proﬁle and valuable trade because of some important factors such as speculation from other countries and criminal networks.
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